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ABSTRACT: The 1988 Piper Alpha disaster remains one of the
worst safety-related accidents of its kind in the Oil & Gas sector.
However, whereas the myriad lessons learned from this disaster are
common knowledge among chemical and process engineers, the
valuable safety lessons from this harrowing story are arguably not
so obvious to laboratory chemists. Herein, a breakdown of and
personally lived long-term perspective on the Piper Alpha accident
is provided to show the transferrable lessons available for
improving chemical laboratory safety culture.
■ INTRODUCTION
On the 6th July, 1988, safety lapses aboard the Piper Alpha oil rig
resulted in a series of devastating explosions.1,2 This and related
process safety accidents are well-known among chemical
engineers,3 but less so among chemists.4 Situated 140 miles
off the coast of Aberdeen, Scotland, the Piper Alpha oil rig
disintegrated in under 3 h, claiming the lives of 165 of the 226
men on board, plus those of 2 rescue crewmen (Figure 1). With
only 61 survivors of the accident and approximately $3.4 billion
total insured damages,5−7 the Piper Alpha disaster remains one
of the worst such events in the Oil & Gas sector and now serves
as a perennial process safety textbook case study.8 I have chosen
to share the transferrable safety lessons from Piper Alpha
specificallyrather than those from any other such accident
because my father, Mark Archibald Reid, was among the 61
survivors.9,10
■ AIMS
The aim of this Commentary is to strip back the particulars and
specifics of a disaster like Piper Alpha and distill out the valuable
long-term process safety lessons applicable across sectors and
scales of operation. It is hoped that, despite the seeming
disconnect between an oil rig accident and an audience of
chemists, the personal motivations and experience of this author
will make the key lessons clear and transferrable to those
working at the bench.
■ PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE LONG-TERM
MORAL IMPACT OF SAFETY FAILURES
At the time of the Piper Alpha disaster, I was just three months
old (Figure 2, see newspaper caption). It would be several years
before my perspective on the long-term additive effects of safety
failures would start to play out in my life. In my childhood years,
I remember noticing that my father’s hands appeared somehow
older than they should be. To my young eyes, he had the hands
of my grandfather, not the hands of a young man. I would later
learn that the curious wrinkles onmy father’s hands were, in fact,
skin grafts: an eternal reminder of the burns he endured during
his escape from the burning Piper Alpha rig. In those earliest
days of my life, I was too young to understand the accident or the
struggles my father would later face.
As I grew older and more mature, so too did the forthcoming
details of my father’s ordeal. His once funny-looking hands now
told the story of a man who screamed with uncontrolled fear
when he was in plunged into darkness after the first explosion hit
the rig.13 His tired and elderly hands were the same hands used
to squeeze tomato juice onto his burning face to relieve the
intense heat of the evolving fire aboard Piper Alpha. Slowly,
surely, over the years, the difficult details of just one disaster
survivor’s experience came into my knowing. Whereas I knew
only the playful side of my father inmy youth, I grew to learn that
this was the same person who negotiated his way through
burning decks, passed collapsed colleagues and plumes of
smoke, to a burning helideck some 175 feet (six London buses)
above sea level. Theman I was fortunate enough to grow up with
was the same man who was somehow able to jump from the
Piper Alpha inferno, through an eerie silence, and resurface in
the freezing North Sea.
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The true lasting lesson of how safety failures impact lives over
a long time was still to come. Like some 3.9% of the worldwide
population exposed to disaster situations,14 my father suffered
from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)15 following his
Piper Alpha ordeal, as did 21% of Piper Alpha survivors
interviewed after their experience.16 (See Figure 3.) Long after
the details of his escape were revealed to me, the story became
that of a man periodically relapsing into alcoholism, fracturing
family ties, and losing all hope of establishing a normal working
life.9,10 The Piper Alpha disaster may have occurred in the
summer of 1988, but its impact would ripple like a tidal wave
through our family life for another 23 years. While the accident
was the first and most visible domino to fall, many other
dominos, initially obscured from view, would tumble one by one
until the last. On 25th August, 2011, just a few months before I
started my PhD, my father succumbed to his recurring PTSD-
induced alcoholism, dying as a result of related health
Figure 1.Top:3 Location of Piper Alpha relative to other platforms in the North Sea. Adapted with permission from ref 3. Copyright 2011Willie Scott.
Bottom: Images of the platform before3 and in the aftermath11 of the explosions. Adapted from refs 3 and 11, respectively. Copyright Bob Flemeur and
the Daily Record, respectively.
Figure 2. Interview photograph of Piper Alpha survivor (Mark
Archibald Reid), the author’s father.12 The “14-week-old son” referred
to in the caption is the author of this article. Adapted with permission
from ref 12. Copyright 1988 Aberdeen Journals Ltd.
Figure 3.Three of 61 Piper Alpha survivors recovering from their injury
in the days following the accident, including the author’s father, Mark
Archibald Reid (center).10 Reprinted with permission from ref 10.
Copyright 1988 Energy Voice.
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complications. He had only my younger brother by his side as he
passed. My father was just 48 years old.
■ PIPER ALPHA BACKGROUND
Prior to the disastrous events that ended operations in 1988,
Piper Alpha had operated successfully in the North Sea for some
12 years. Erected in 1976, the rig was a highly profitable and
productive platform for operators Occidental Petroleum.3
■ ACCIDENT TIMELINE
From the public inquiry led by Lord Cullen,17 a timeline of the
accident has been mapped out, delineating the combination of
events that led to the first explosion. While this timeline can be
(and has been) articulated in several different ways,18−21 a
simplified timeline is presented (Table 1) and focuses on the
main events that occurred on 6th−7th July, 1988.
■ FAILINGS
Following 12 years of successful operation, the Piper Alpha
became the first ever offshore platform to be lost to disaster. The
in-depth investigation into the disaster revealed the harrowing
series of events that led to its untimely demise.17 Working
primarily from scattered eye-witness accounts and serendipitous
photographs taken from neighboring boats,18 the root cause of
the disaster was determined over the course of a two-year
investigation.
The rig produced three possible sources of ignition: crude oil,
natural gas, and petroleum condensate. From the eye-witness
descriptions of the initial explosion, it could be determined that
condensate was the most likely fuel source. Indeed, this was
consistent with the reported series of alarms sounding in the
control room. Zeroing in on the location of the condensate leak
led investigators to the aforementioned condensate pumps and
safety valves. One of the safety valves had been removed for
maintenance. To seal the open pipe while the safety valve was
off, a metal disk (or flange) was temporarily inserted. Crucially,
this was judged to be safe because the particular pump
connected to the pipe was switched off, containing no fuel at
the time maintenance workers finished their shift and fitted the
open pipe with the temporary disk to continue their work the
next day.
It was not yet clear how a pipe fitted with a temporary sealing
disk and apparently not connected to an active pump could lead
to the catastrophic loss of condensate containment. The
question was: How does a pipeline containing no fuel lead to a
high-pressure leak and explosion? Reconstructions revealed that
the replacement disk in place while the safety valve was off for
maintenance was likely to have been only loosely fitted,
tightened by hand rather than by wrench. Under such
conditions, a gap (perhaps invisible to the eye) was left open,
Table 1. Abbreviated Timeline of the Piper Alpha Disaster, 6th−7th July, 1988
24 hclock time Event
07:45 Permit to work forms for routine maintenance are issued and signed.
A common safety system, the permit to work aims to ensure that only qualified personnel are working on a task and only when it is safe to do so.
12:00 Maintenance staff begin work to remove a safety valve on the rig’s production deck.
The aim is to finish valve maintenance within the day shift.
17:10 The current shift leader begins discussions with the incoming nightshift leader in order to provide a brief on the day’s activities.
There is nothing out-of-the-ordinary or significant to report.
18:00 Day shift ends, but maintenance work on the safety valve is not yet complete.
The pump that said valve is connected to is shut down, and it was decided that the maintenance work will continue the next morning.
Because the connected pump is shut down, this raises no issue or concern.
21:45 An alarm sounds in the control room, signaling an issue with a condensate pump (holding pressurized and highly flammable liquified petroleum).
The pump had tripped, but this common problem was normally easy to fix.
Despite the crew’s best efforts to attend the faulty pump, it could not be restarted successfully on this occasion.
This leads to increased stress among staff who are aware that, if the pump problem cannot be resolved, the rig will go into unproductive shutdown.
As a potential solution to the problem, there is a reserve pump available; however, it is currently down for maintenance.
The operations manager checks the associated permit for maintenance work on the pump that is currently out of operation.
Confirming that maintenance has not yet started on the reserve pump, it is signed back into service so that it can serve to resolve the escalating issue
with the active condensate pump that has tripped.
21:55 Additional alarms go off in the control room, signaling gas leaks in the deck above the location of the pumps.
The number of alarms sounding continues to increase, culminating in the most serious such alarmhigh gas.
22:00 The first explosion occurs.
A nearby boat captain reports a flash of a blue flame projecting out from underneath the platform.
The control room operator hits the emergency shutdown panel, causing power generators to turn off and all main oil and gas line valves to close.
Because the main alarm panel has been destroyed in the explosion, no emergency alarms sound.
The later inquiry would conclude that this explosion most likely originated in Module C (there were fouradjacent modules A - D), where there was a
condensate leak from the poorly sealed disk that had been temporarily employed in place of the safety valve removed for maintenance.
22:05 Nearby boats all launch small safety vessels to help recover survivors.
22:20 A second major explosion engulfs the Piper Alpha platform.
This explosion sets the helideck ablaze, making a helicopter rescue impossible for those men trapped in living areas near the top of the platform.
22:50 A third huge explosion rages through the burning core of Piper Alpha.
This explosion captures a rescue boat in the vicinity of the platform, killing some survivors and crewmen.
23:20 As the platform begins to disintegrate, a fourth explosion rips through the remaining structure.
The platform begins to lean and collapse.
00:45 The vast majority of the oil rig is no more.
Large sections of the platform, including cranes, living quarters, and drilling decks, have crumbled into the North Sea.
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creating gaps through which any adventitious pressurized
material could leak. Still, it was supposed to be the case that
this pipe was connected to an inactive pump, containing no fuel
and thus no source of ignition. How, then, could it be the case
that the loosely fitted disk was the most likely point of the first
explosion? In the fray to keep production running after the active
condensate pump tripped at 21:45, the inactive reserve pump,
connected to the pipe containing the loose disk, was signed back
into service. Condensate was then released by an operator into
the reserve pump that, unknown to operators, was connected to
the pipe that had been inadequately sealed. This eventually led
to the major condensate release in Module C that led to the first
explosion.
Going further, the first explosion was assessed to be minor
compared to what was to come. Located in Module C,
serendipitous photographic evidence revealed that the explosion
unexpectedly broke through into neighboring Module B,
supposedly protected by fire walls.22 While this barrier to
protection was fit to withstand hot flames for up to 6 h, the same
protective barrier was not able to withstand explosions. The
investigation later revealed that the fire wall between platform
Modules B and C was completely unable to withstand
explosions of any notable force. The resulting debris from the
explosion in Module C was believed to have ruptured a weak
condensate pipe in the adjacent Module B once the fire wall
between Modules B and C failed.
Remarkably, this domino-like series of events23 is still not
telling the full story. The explosions occurring in the first two
neighboring modules were not large enough to account for the
observable fire ball that engulfed the entire platform at 22:20.
Further photographic evidence pointed to an unexpected third
location of fire, not in or adjacent to the aforementioned
modules, but rather in the deck below all of these modules. This
third fire location was additionally surprising on account of the
fact that it was seemingly situated at a grated floor, through
which burning oil should have dripped straight through and into
the sea without any major incident. However, the photograph
revealed a localized fire that eventually indicated that rubber
matting had been placed on the grated flooring (by divers not
wanting to place their bare feet on the sharp grating). The rubber
matting collected burning oil dripping down from Module B
above it. This, in turn, superheated a pipeline containing a high-
pressure gas link running to a sister rig, Tartan. The pipeline
ruptured as a result, providing a near instantaneous source of
15−30 tons of fuel for the existing fire. The fuel released at this
point, that which led to the massive fire ball at 22:20, was
equivalent to the immediate release of the entire annual
domestic gas consumption of the UK (Figure 4).
The crucial loss of the live pipeline running from Piper Alpha
to Tartan was just one of three such connecting pipelines. In
other words, there remained two active, fuel-containing
pipelines running along Piper Alpha after two major explosions
had already torn through the rig. Inevitably, the two remaining
pipelines eventually failed, leading to the third and fourth
explosions on the rig. Alas, this was the final death nail, the last
domino to fall, for all those workers who still remained onboard
Piper Alpha. Tragically, the automatic fire drench system on
Piper alpha was in manual mode the night of the blast. Such an
auto-to-manual switch was common given that the system was
often in manual mode to protect divers under the rig from being
sucked into the turbines. On the night of the fire, no water to
drown the fire was released from the Piper Alpha platform itself.
The final causal issue revealed in the Piper Alpha investigation
pointed to the crucial paperwork in place to ensure that all
works, maintenance or otherwise, were only carried out when it
was safe to do so, and when no parallel tasks was ongoing that
could jeopardize the safety of those working. From astonishing
efforts to recover the sunken wreckage, surviving paperwork was
discovered that revealed that two separate permits to work were
issued for both the maintenance on the condensate pump and,
separately, for the work to maintain the safety valve. Why should
it matter that these two safety permits were issued separately?
Each permit to work, authorizing safe working conditions at a
given point in time, was stored in the location where it was used.
The condensate pump and its safety valve were located in two
separate decks on the rig. As a result, operators looking at the
permit to work for the pump had nothing accompanying this
paperwork to suggest that the pump’s safety valve was removed
and replaced by a simple, loosely fitted flat disk. When the
decision was made to try to start the reserve pump after the first
proved faulty, the decision was made by operators who had no
knowledge of the accompanying safety valve for this pump
having been removed. The permit to work for the pump did not
mention the safety valve. In this mismatch of paperwork is the
most compelling evident root cause of the whole series of
devastating events that played out over the 90 min that would
later consume the Piper Alpha oil rig and 167 men involved on
that fateful evening (see Figure 5).
■ TRANSFERRABLE LESSONS FROM PIPER ALPHA
The specifics of the Piper Alpha disaster may seem to the reader
to be entirely disconnected with the safety concerns of the bench
chemist.24−26 It is a large-scale process-level accident that, on the
surface, is nothing like the tragic death of Sheri Sangji at UCLA
in 2008,26 or the horrendous debilitating explosion at the
University of Hawai’i in 2016 in which Dr. Thea Ekins-Coward
lost her arm.27−29 However, stripping back the specific detail
reveals core lessons that are transferrable lessons of deep value,
regardless of the specific industry. Such lessons include the
following.
(i) Moral (human) costs: Perhaps most obviously, safety
failings can lead to fatalities, physical injuries, and deep
mental struggles. This is the message central to the
Figure 4. East projection of the Piper Alpha platform drawn to
approximate scale. This shows a simplified representation of the four
interconnected modules and approximate timelines and locations of the
domino-like cascading explosions leading to catastrophe. The last
explosion shown, occurring at 22:20 below Module B, was the site of
major pipe works containing high-pressure fuel flowing between Piper
Alpha and neighboring platforms. (A)Well heads for oil extraction from
sea floor. (B) Oil separation. (C) Gas compression. (D) Power
generation.
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Commentary. But whether it is a disaster like Piper Alpha,
or lab-based accidents like the tragic cases of Sheri
Sangji26 or Thea Ekins-Coward,27−29 there is a long-term
moral cost associated with each and every safety-related
accident. And just as physical site assets can fall like
dominos during an escalating disaster,23 so too can
lifelong challenges align and fall over time. This point is
depicted conceptually in Figures 6 and 7.
(ii) Financial and reputational damage: In the UK, for
example, safety-related failings cost the economy
approximately $20 billion annually.30 This is the
combined result of lost work hours, legal fees,
compensation payouts, fines, asset damage, and other
costs associated with a given accident. Occidental
Petroleum, owners of the Piper Alpha platform,
reportedly paid out approximately $100 million to the
families of those killed in the accident.31,32 Armand
Hammer, chairman of Occidental at the time of the Piper
Alpha disaster, visited survivors 2 days after the accident
during his one and only trip to Aberdeen, Scotland.
Financial struggles emerging after an accident is
exemplified in the aforementioned case of Thea Ekins-
Coward, who (some three years after her initial ordeal)
was challenged by a prolonged legal battle, loss of
earnings, and related career arrest.29
(iii) Safe shift handover and management of change:
Whether there is a change in lab staff, installation of
new equipment, or an entire research group relocating,
any change to working conditions can result in
unexpected compromises in laboratory or plant safety.33
A seemingly innocent change in one area can have
unintended ripple effects in another. If such changes are
not properly risk assessed, the results can be as dire as
Piper Alpha. At the point of shift handover on the evening
of 6th July, 1988, control room operators on the night
shift did not have complete information from the
departing day shift staff. Indeed, due to issues with the
separately located permits to work for pump operation
and safety valve maintenance, it was effectively impossible
Figure 5. Simplified sequence of condensate pumps and pressure valves on Piper Alpha, showing the resulting changes in operation that accidentally
led to the first explosion. Two different permits to work existed for condensate pump A and safety valve A. When pump A needed to be reinstated by
operators at ∼21:45, they could not have known that safety valve A was down for maintenance and fitted with a loose flange not fit for handling the
high-pressure condensate.
Figure 6. Considering the immediate details available in the aftermath
of an accident (view A) fails to reveal the longer-term moral challenges
that play out over a much longer period of time (view B). The exemplar
long-term effects revealed by the longer-term perspective shown in this
figure relate to the specific case of Piper Alpha survivor, Mark Archibald
Reid, described above.
Figure 7. The author’s father was affected by a domino-like series of
long-term ailments following his Piper Alpha experience. Despite the
seeming disconnect across sectors, parallels can be drawn to the 2016
gas explosion accident at the University of Hawai’i. Dr. Thea Ekins-
Coward lost part of her right arm in an explosion caused by use of
dangerous lab equipment not fit-for-purpose and substandard safety
training.27−29 The transferrable lesson from Piper Alpha is that many
moral implications of the Hawai’i accident have partially emerged over
an extended period of time. The specific long-term effects can be
identified on a case-by-case basis.
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that all necessary information could be made available to
incoming staff when the shift changed.
(iv) Equipment specification and fit-for-purpose: A full and
proper assessment of equipment versus its intended
purpose is crucial in any lab or process environment. In
the case of Piper Alpha, the fire walls fitted between
operational modules were known to protect against
intense f ires, but were not adequately designed to protect
against ferocious explosions. Similarly, improper electrical
grounding lay at the cause of the explosion that irreparably
injured Thea Ekins-Coward at the University of
Hawai’i.27,29 In the chemistry lab, another exemplar
comparison could include use of improper personal
protective equipment. This was indeed the case for
Professor Karen Wetterhahn, who died as a resulted of
mercury poisoning after she was exposed to a lethal dose
of the infamously toxic metal in her laboratory in
1997.26,34
(v) Permit to work system: Whether working on an oil rig,
chemical plant, nuclear site, or university laboratory, one
should be able to prove, when challenged, proof of
competency and clear justification for working at a given
place and at any given time. For Piper Alpha, two separate
permits to work (one dealing with a safety valve, the other
dealing with its separately located pump) led to ineffective
and incomplete information for two different groups of
workers. Fateful decisions that were made with regards to
activating the pump that was not fitted with an
appropriate safety valve thus led to an unintended but
altogether catastrophic accident.
(vi) Root cause analysis:35 It was a full two years after the
Piper Alpha disaster that the official inquiry was
published.17 It covers two volumes, one of which was in
part dedicated to analyzing the “root cause” of the
disaster. In other words, a great deal of work was placed in
finding the most likely culprit that started the chain of
events leading to the demise of the entire oil rig. For any
accident, it is possible to explain, in a sentence, what
happened in the immediacy of the event. However, this
approach fails to spot the first in a series of linked events
leading to the accident itself. Using Piper Alpha as the
continued exemplar, one might describe the accident as
being caused by the ignition of flammable condensate lost
from a loose pipe fitting in Module C. However, this is
merely the last in the chain of events leading to the first
explosion. The root cause, rather than the immediate
cause, is the source event in the working environment
that, if preempted and mitigated, could have prevented all
future events leading to the disaster. For Piper Alpha,
failures in the permit to work, described in point (v)
above, was the root cause of what later became the worst
ever oil rig disaster as well as a source of long-term
struggles for survivors and bereaved families alike. In the
study of behavior-based safety, it is now becoming more
widely accepted that the working environment, less-so the
individual, is responsible for 90% of actions that lead to
safety failures.36 Therefore, in analyzing accidents in the
chemistry laboratory, it is worth assessing the current
laboratory setup, mandatory safety protocols, and safety
culture as part of any investigation. It is useless to limit
investigation timelines to the immediate events surround-
ing the accident. The root cause of an accident is what is
most telling and most educational for proactively
mitigating future safety failures.
(vii) Warnings from previous events: Eight years before Piper
Alpha, the Norwegian oil rig, Alexander Kielland, was
involved in an accident that led to the deaths of 123
workers after the semisubmersible platform cap-
sized.37−39 105 of 106 safety improvements recommen-
ded by the Cullen report following the Piper Alpha
disaster had already been implemented in Norway
following the earlier accident. Alas, such recommenda-
tions for change were not implemented in the UK until
after the Piper Alpha disaster. Piper Alpha would itself be
viewed as a “previous event” when, in 2010, the
Deepwater Horizon platform, based in the Gulf of Mexico
exploded, killing 11 men.40 For the Piper Alpha (failing to
learn from Alexander Kielland) and Deepwater Horizon
(failing to learn from Piper Alpha), the long-term moral
implications of the preceding disaster were presumably
not given sufficient exposure to motivate workers and
decision-makers on the newer platforms to adopt more
proactive safety cultures and procedures. The moral
fallout from the older events was not in prominent
view.9,10,15,16,25,39,41,42
■ BROADER PERSPECTIVE ON PROCESS SAFETY
DISASTERS
Unfortunately, the Piper Alpha disaster is just one instance of
many large-scale safety failings in process-related sectors. Just
like Piper Alpha, all other known process safety cases have
resulted from a series of cumulative events leading to a
seemingly unlikely and immensely damaging accident. And,
just like Piper Alpha, each of the other accidents mentioned have
spine-chilling stories to tell (Table 2).41−49 At the time of writing
Table 2. Selected Process Safety Incidents, 1974−2019
Year Location Accident Damage
197443 Flixborough, UK Nypro UK chemical explosion 28 deaths; 36 injuries
197644 Italy Seveso 26 pregnancies aborted; 80,000 animals slaughtered; ∼220,000 chronic
illnesses
198037,38,39 Norway Alexander Kielland drilling rig capsizes 123 dead
198441,42 Bhopal, India Union Carbide methyl isocyanide disaster >2,259 dead
19881,3,4,9,17 Aberdeen,UK Piper Alpha oil rig explosion 167 dead
199445 Iowa, USA Terra Industries’ fertilizer plant explosion 4 dead; 18 injured
200746 Florida, USA T2 laboratories explosion 4 dead; 32 injured
201040 Louisiana, USA Deepwater Horizon deep well explosion 11 dead; unprecedented oil spill
201547 Tianjin, China Ruihai Logistics nitrocellulose storage
explosion
173 dead; 12,428 cars destroyed
201948 Sipitang, Malaysia Petronas plant ammonia leak 2 dead; 3 injured
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this Commentary, it has been 35 years since the Bhopal Disaster,
where thousands of Indian citizens were killed and injured
following a massive methyl isocyanate leak from the Union
Carbide plant. It remains the worst known chemical disaster ever
recorded and reveals harrowing long-term moral implications
emerging from such disasters.41,42
■ CONCLUSIONS
This Commentary has explored the 1988 Piper Alpha disaster
from the personal perspective of the author, a survivor’s son.
Having survived the disaster but enduredmany lifelong struggles
as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the story of
Mark Archibald Reid can serve as an informative, moralistic
exemplar of how a difficult narrative can promote clearer
understanding of the long-term impact of safety-related failures.
Additional exemplars of the often-hidden long-term moral
consequences of accidents have been combined with the
detailed Piper Alpha commentary to bridge this story to those
more directly relevant to the research chemical laboratory.
The root cause of the Piper Alpha disaster was primarily an
inappropriate permit to work system. On the night of the
tragedy, workers reinstated and injected condensate fluid into a
pump, not knowing a safety valve on another deck had been
removed and replaced by a non-leak-proof disk. The high-
pressure condensate flow leaked from the disk and soon ignited.
The first explosion broke through a fire wall that was not fit to
stand up to explosive events. This led to secondary explosions in
the module neighboring the location of the initial leak. Rubber
matting used by divers on a lower deck accumulated a pool fire
which ultimately resulted in the devastating and irreversible
damage of the fire ball that engulfed the platform at 22:20 on 6th
July, 1988. From this point onward, the fate of the oil rig was
sealed.
From a safety-focused conference some 30 years later, the
investigative lead, the Rt Hon Lord Cullen, remarked:
“It’s not much good having an investigation if it doesn’t lead to
lasting improvements in safety ... results being embedded in the
control of risk and reflected in the way in which work is tackled
and done.”50
By providing a personal account of the longer-term moral
consequences of an accident, it is hoped that it contributes to
heightened safety awareness and practices in all dangerous
environments, offshore, onshore, in chemistry laboratories, and
beyond. Future research is encouraged to shed light on the
chemistry-specific value-added from raised awareness of the
moral consequences of accidents often hidden in long-term
obscurity.
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